Optimizing Trade-offs Among Stakeholders in Real-Time Bidding by
  Incorporating Multimedia Metrics by Chen, Xiang et al.
Optimizing Trade-os Among Stakeholders in Real-Time
Bidding by Incorporating Multimedia Metrics
Xiang Chen
National University of Singapore
chxiang@comp.nus.edu.sg
Bowei Chen
University of Lincoln
bchen@lincoln.ac.uk
Mohan Kankanhalli
National University of Singapore
mohan@comp.nus.edu.sg
ABSTRACT
Displaying banner advertisements (in short, ads) on webpages has
usually been discussed as an Internet economics topic where a
publisher uses auction models to sell an online user’s page view
to advertisers and the one with the highest bid can have her ad
displayed to the user. is is also called real-time bidding (RTB)
and the ad displaying process ensures that the publisher’s benet
is maximized or there is an equilibrium in ad auctions. However,
the benets of the other two stakeholders – the advertiser and the
user – have been rarely discussed. In this paper, we propose a
two-stage computational framework that selects a banner ad based
on the optimized trade-os among all stakeholders. e rst stage
is still auction based and the second stage re-ranks ads by con-
sidering the benets of all stakeholders. Our metric variables are:
the publisher’s revenue, the advertiser’s utility, the ad memorabil-
ity, the ad click-through rate (CTR), the contextual relevance, and
the visual saliency. To the best of our knowledge, this is the rst
work that optimizes trade-os among all stakeholders in RTB by
incorporating multimedia metrics. An algorithm is also proposed
to determine the optimal weights of the metric variables. We use
both ad auction datasets and multimedia datasets to validate the
proposed framework. Our experimental results show that the pub-
lisher can signicantly improve the other stakeholders’ benets by
slightly reducing her revenue in the short-term. In the long run,
advertisers and users will be more engaged, the increased demand
of advertising and the increased supply of page views can then
boost the publisher’s revenue.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Over the last few years, a signicant development in display ad-
vertising is the emergence of RTB. It is a non-guaranteed delivery
system in which page views (also called impressions) are bought and
sold via programmatic instantaneous auctions [15]. e success of
RTB can be largely aributed to its user targeting and wide access.
In RTB, advertisers bid for an impression from their targeted user
and this impression can be from any webpage from any ad network
or platform. If an advertiser wins the auction, her ad will be selected
and be displayed to the user in almost real time.
RTB has two major limitations. e rst limitation is that it can
not provide guaranteed delivery to advertisers. erefore, those
who want to secure and access future impressions in advance will
not be satised [29]. e solution is to develop a new system that en-
ables time-dependent allocation and pricing of future impressions.
Notable examples include the recently discussed programmatic
guarantee and ad options [8–11, 41]. e second limitation of RTB
is that those displayed ads may not t their hosting webpages well
due to user targeting. It can be: the ad content is irrelevant to the
webpage content; the color of the ad image is too light or dark
to suciently contrast with the webpage color scheme. Ill-ing
ads will aect the eectiveness of ad branding for the advertiser,
or even worse annoy users, and potentially reduce the publisher’s
webpage visits and revenue. It should be noted that this limitation
only exists in display advertising, since sponsored search ads are
displayed in terms of textual links where visual eects are not very
important and also these ads are keyword-based which are well
matched with the user’s search query. In display advertising, this
limitation is worth investigating. Firstly, it has received surprisingly
lile aention in the recent studies. Secondly, it is an interesting
topic that lies in the area combining the research of marketing,
multimedia, recommendation, and Internet economics.
In this paper, we discuss a solution to the second limitation of
RTB by proposing a computational framework that optimizes trade-
os among stakeholders. As shown in Fig. 1, the framework has
two stages. e rst stage is based on the existing ad auction model
used in RTB; and the second stage re-ranks ads based on the optimal
trade-os. In the re-ranking, there are six metric variables: the pub-
lisher’s revenue, the advertiser’s utility, the ad memorability, the
ad CTR, the contextual relevance and the visual saliency. Revenue
is always the key concern for the publisher. From an advertiser’s
perspective, her utility is the short-term benet and the ad mem-
orability is the long-term benet. e rest three metric variables
represent the user’s benets. Under the proposed framework, we
discuss an algorithm that determines the optimal weights of the
metric variables. In the paper, we validate the proposed framework
on several datasets, including ad auction datasets and multimedia
datasets. e ground truth and possible weights combinations for
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Figure 1: Schematic view of the two-stage framework.
re-ranking are discussed. Our experimental results show that a
slight decrease in the publisher’s revenue can increase the perfor-
mance of other variables signicantly in the short term, which will
also improve the engagements of both advertisers and users in the
long term, and further increase the publisher’s revenue.
is paper has two major contributions. Firstly, the user’s ben-
ets have been taken into account. is is similar to the work of
Bachrach et al. [3]. Compared to their work, we increase the di-
mension of benets by discussing trade-os among stakeholders’
multiple benets. e framework is also tailored to RTB rather
than sponsored search. Our proposed model can be regarded as
a generalized framework that non-guaranteedly deliveries banner
ads in RTB. Secondly, multimedia metrics have been introduced to
measure some stakeholders’ benets, such as the ad memorability,
the contextual relevance, and the visual saliency. ese metrics
naturally t display banner ads but have not yet been discussed
along with auction models in previous studies. To the best of our
knowledge, this is the rst work that combines multimedia metrics
and auction theory together.
e rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews
the related literature. Section 3 discusses the proposed two-stage
framework. Section 4 presents our experimental results, and Sec-
tion 5 concludes the paper.
2 RELATEDWORK
In online advertising, the generalized second-price (GSP) auction [14,
40] and the Vickrey-Clark-Groves (VCG) auction [32] have been
widely used on dierent platforms, including display and search
domains. Revenue maximization is always the key issue. Lahaie and
Pennock [19] proposed to use a squashing parameter to increase
revenue of GSP auctions in sponsored search, and then Lahaie and
McAfee [18] showed that it can improve social welfare as well.
Ostrovsky and Schwarz [30] investigated the eects of optimal re-
serve prices for GSP auctions on Yahoo’s platform. ompson and
Leyton-Brown [39] studied a variety of ways of increasing revenue
of GSP auctions, including reserve prices and squashing parameter.
Furthermore, Yuan et al. [42] implemented a large scale experiment
and empirically compared algorithms of seing reserve price for
maximizing revenue in RTB.
Trade-os among multiple objectives or stakeholders have been
discussed in several works. Likhodedov and Sandholm [23] pro-
posed a framework that linearly combines revenue and social wel-
fare in a single-item auction. Radlinski et al. [34] investigated the
optimization of relevance and revenue in sponsored search. Sim-
ilarily, Liao et al. [22] combined revenue and relevance for video
advertising. Lucier et al. [24] discussed the revenue of GSP auction
at equilibrium, and demonstrated that revenue can be maximized
at a non-envy-free equilibrium that also generates a socially in-
ecient allocation. Roberts et al. [36] discussed a new ranking
algorithm for sponsored search auction that uses reserve prices to
order the ads and discussed conditions under which revenue can be
increased. Bachrach et al. [3] proposed a framework that linearly
combines objectives relevant to the search engine (revenue), the
advertiser (welfare), and the user (clicks).
Most related advertising research focuses on the economic ben-
ets, lile aention has been paid to the advertiser’s branding
eectiveness and user’s experience. erefore, we introduce sev-
eral multimedia metrics in this paper. Literature in marketing and
consumer psychology has already shown that the contextual rele-
vance between the content of hosting webpage and the ads makes
a large dierence in their clickability [7], and it also has a leading
eect on user’s online experience [25]. ere exists rich research
on measuring the contextual relevance using textual information.
Neto et al. [35] investigated ten strategies for a vector space model
and evaluated their eectiveness individually. Although the vector
space model is widely used, a more advanced matching strategy is
required due to the vocabulary impedance problem among ads and
webpages. Broder et al. [5] proposed an approach for contextual
ad matching based on a combination of semantic and syntactic
features. Li et al. [21] further measured the contextual relevance
by introducing category relevance, keyword relevance, and style
relevance. Category relevance measures whether the ad and web-
page belong to the same category; keyword relevance measures the
relevance between the keywords extracted from ads and webpage;
and style relevance measures the style consistency between the ads
and webpage. Zhang et al. [44] proposed an advertising keywords
recommendation system for short-text webpages with the help of
Wikipedia. Other than textual information, images and videos are
more popular on the Internet. Chen et al. [13] allocated ads for
images through image recognition techniques. To achieve beer
contextual relevance, Mei et al. [26, 27] and Guo et al. [16] proposed
a multimodal approach which considered both textual and visual
relevance for video and image advertising.
Although display banner ads appear on nearly every webpage,
their eectiveness remains debatable. rough a series of eye-
tracking experiments, recent research found that users tend to
avoid ads in web search and surng [4] and they intentionally avoid
looking at such ads even when they are designed to be aention-
grabbing [37]. is is also known as ad overlook. Moreover, Owen
et al. [31] explored the relationship between ads location and the
degree of blindness – the phenomenon of website users actively
Table 1: Notations.
Notation Description
Z , Z˜ Set of auctions
Nz Set of advertisers in auction z, z ∈ Z
K Set of metric variables for Stage II re-ranking, |K | = 6
bi,z Bid price of advertiser i in auction z , i ∈ Nz, z ∈ Z
b(i ),z ith highest bid in auction z , i ∈ Nz, z ∈ Z
yi, j,z Probability that advertiser i is allocated to slot j in auction z
pi,z (bz ) Payment of advertiser i in auction z , bz = (b1,z, · · · , bnz ,z )
ωk Weight of metric variable k in the re-ranking, k ∈ K
xk,∗,z Value of metric variable k for the selected advertiser in auction
z by our proposed model
xk,¬,z Value of metric variable k for the selected advertiser in auction
z by the SP auction (the ground truth)
ξk,Z Average change of metric variable k of auctions in set Z
θk reshold for the change of metric variable k
rsi,z Rank score of advertiser i in auction z
rs∗,z Rank score of the selected advertiser in auction z by our pro-
posed model
r s¬,z Rank score of the selected advertiser in auction z by the SP
auction (the ground truth)
ignore web banner ads – and found that users tend to ignore ads
located on the boom and right area. Intuitively, any ad that fails
to capture an user’s aention will be ineective in delivering in-
formation. It has been recognized that there are ve basic stages
before a user accepts a message: aention, comprehension, yielding,
retention and action [1]. Motivated by the above observation, in
addition to the contextual relevance, we further introduce two other
factors to increase user engagement towards banner ads: the visual
saliency and the ad image memorability. e former increases the
probability that an user will notice the displayed ad while the laer
improves an user’s brand perception aer she sees the ad image.
3 THE TWO-STAGE FRAMEWORK
e proposed framework consists of two stages. e rst stage is
based on the second-price (SP) auction model. e second stage re-
ranks ads based on the weighted linear combination of benets of
multiple stakeholders, which ensures the selected ad will optimize
the trade-os among them. For the reader’s convenience, the key
notations are summarized in Table 1.
3.1 Stage I: Ad Auction
In RTB, the SP auction model has been widely used. Consider
auction z ∈ Z , a single impression is bidded by nz advertisers,
their cost-per-impression1 bids are denoted by a bid vector bz =
(b1,z , · · · ,bnz,z ), and their true values are denoted by a value vector
vz = (v1,z , · · · ,vnz,z ). In the simplest scenario, the advertiser with
the highest bid will be selected and her ad will be displayed to
the user. When the ad is displayed, the advertiser then pays the
publisher for this page view. In order to re-rank ads in the second
stage, we need to know what would be the possible payments from
other advertisers. To achieve this, nz −1 pseudo ad slots are created
so that the payments from other advertisers can be estimated.
1In display advertising industry, the cost-per-impression is usually quoted in terms of
cost-per-mille (CPM) which represents the price of 1000 impressions.
We denote the auction outcome by {yi, j,z ,pi,z }i ∈Nz, j ∈Nz,z∈Z ,
where yi, j,z is the probability that advertiser i is allocated to slot
j in auction z, and pi,z is her payment. Note that slots are ranked
so that slot j ≥ 2 is the created pseudo slot. e auction outcome
satises the following conditions:
0 ≤ yi, j,z ≤ 1, (1)∑
i ∈Nz
yi, j,z ≤ 1, (2)∑
j ∈Nz
yi, j,z ≤ 1. (3)
Let b(i),z be the ith highest bid in bz , then
yi, j,z (bz ) = I{bi,z=b(j ),z }, (4)
where I{·} is the indicator function. en advertiser i’s payment is
pi,z (bz ) =
∑
j ∈Nz
b(j+1),zyi, j,z (bz ), (5)
where b(nz+1),z is equal to the reserve price, whose value can be
set to be any value between 0 and b(nz ),z .
3.2 Stage II: Optimal Re-Ranking
All advertisers are re-ranked in the second stage. e rank score of
advertiser i, i ∈ Nz , is dened as follows:
rsi,z =
∑
k ∈K
ωkxk,i,z , (6)
where xk,i,z is the input value of metric variable k , ωk is its weight,
and k ∈ K = {1, · · · , 6}. Below we discuss what are these variables,
how to obtain their input values and their weights in the re-ranking.
3.2.1 Specifications of Metric Variables. Table 2 species our
metric variables in the re-ranking, including the publisher’s rev-
enue, the advertiser’ utility, the ad memorability, the ad CTR, the
contextual relevance, and the ad saliency. e input values of these
metric variables in the second stage are denoted by xk,i,z ,∀k ∈ K ,
respectively. ey are the normalized values lying between 0 and 1
by using the min-max method for a set of auctions.
Revenue is always the key issue for the publisher. In rank score
rsi,z , it can be measured by advertiser i’s (normalized) payment,
whose value can be obtained from ad auction in Stage I.
For advertiser i , her benet can be measured at short-term and
long-term levels. e short-term benet is her utility, which is
dened as the dierence between her value and payment. It shows
the advertiser’s cost saving. In the long run, the ad’s memorability
is an important metric, particularly, for branding purpose [28]. It
shows how likely the user will remember the advertiser’s ad a few
weeks or months later. Here we employ the MemNet model [17]
to predict visual memorability of ad image. It is a convolutional
neural network (CNN) trained in an annotated image memorability
dataset, where the input is an ad image and the output is a single
real value which indicates the memorability of this image. e
higher the value is, the more memorable is the image.
e user’s benet can be measured by her page view experi-
ence, including the ad CTR, the contextual relevance and the ad
saliency [20]. e ad CTR is dened as the number of clicks on the
advertiser’s ad divided by the number of displays, whose value is
Table 2: Specications of metric variables for Stage II.
Variable Computation Input for Stage IIMethod Input Output
Publisher’s revenue Stage I Bid Payment x1,i,z = normalized pi,z
Advertiser’s utility Stage I Bid, payment Utility x2,i,z = normalized (vi,z − pi,z )
Ad memorability MemNet [17] Ad image Memorability score x3,i,z = normalized score
Ad CTR Given by data CTR CTR x4,i,z = normalized CTR
Contextual relevance TakeLab [38] Title, keywords, description Semantic similarity score x5,i,z = normalized score
Ad saliency MBS [43] Web page snapshot, ad image Saliency map and ratio x6,i,z = normalized ratio
usually given by data or can be estimated from historical advertising
records. In essence, the ad CTR is an ad quality metric – a high CTR
means that the advertiser’s ad is aractive and also more relevant
to the user’s needs. e contextual relevance measures if the ad
content is more or less relevant to its hosting webpage content. If
an ad is more relevant, it will be less intrusiveness [27]. In the paper,
we use the TakeLab system [38] to measure the semantic similarity
of textual contents between the ad and the webpage. TakeLab uses
a support vector regression model with multiple features measuring
the word-overlap similarity and syntax similarity. e input is two
textual sentences and the output is the semantic similarity score.
e score ranges from 0 to 5, where 0 indicates irrelevant and 5
indicates totally relevant. We construct the textual information of
the webpage and the ad by using the webpage title, keywords and
description, etc. An advantage of TakeLab is that it has an outstand-
ing performance in measuring the similarity between short text
snippets, while most other algorithms focus on large documents.
e ad saliency metric measures whether the ad image can be easily
spoed within its hosting webpage. e more salient ads tend to
draw more user’s aention [12]. In the paper, we use the minimum
barrier salient (MBS) object detection method [43] to calculate the
saliency of the ad image. e input is image screenshots of ad and
webpage, and the output is the corresponding saliency map. For
each pair of webpage and ad candidate, we embed the ad into the
webpage and use the MBS method to compute the saliency map
and the saliency score is the mean value of each pixel within the
ad area.
3.2.2 Determination of the Optimal Weights. e weights of
variables in the rank score determine the optimal trade-os. As
described earlier, the publisher needs to sacrice a certain amount
of revenue in the short term in order to increase the benets of other
stakeholders. Let θ1 be the maximum pre-determined loss rate of
revenue and let θk ,∀k ∈ K\{1}, be the minimum increase rate of
other variables. Given the maximum loss and the minimum increase
targets, we can obtain the optimal weights from the training set Z˜ .
Our algorithm can be expressed as follows:
max
ω1, · · · ,ω6
∑
z∈Z˜
rs∗,z , (7)
subject to 0 ≤ ωk ≤ 1,∀k ∈ K , (8)∑
k ∈K
ωk = 1, (9)
|ξ1,Z˜ | ≤ |θ1 |,θ1 ≤ 0, (10)
ξk,Z˜ ≥ θk ,θk ≥ 0,∀k ∈ K\{1}, (11)
where rs∗,z is the rank score of the selected advertiser in auction z
by our proposed model, ξk,Z˜ is the mean of changes of variable k
between our proposed model and the ground truth, dened by
ξk,Z˜ =
∑
z∈Z˜ (xk,∗,z − xk,¬,z )∑
z∈Z˜ xk,¬,z
, (12)
where xk,∗,z is the input value of metric variable k for the selected
advertiser in auction z by our proposed model, xk,¬,z is the input
value of metric variable k for the selected advertiser in auction z in
the ground truth.
e optimal weights maximize the sum of rank scores of the
select advertisers from all auctions in the training set. Eqs. (8)-
(9) ensure each variable has an impact in the re-ranking but its
impact has an upper bound. Eqs. (10)-(11) further specify the lower
bounds of trade-os where the maximum decrease of the publisher’s
revenue and the minimum increases for other variables.
3.3 Discussion
Display advertising is an interplay among dierent stakeholders. A
vigorous and healthy advertising eco-system should consider the
benets of all stakeholders. Compared with the existing advertising
systems that select ads mainly from the publisher’s interest, our
proposed framework select ads based on the optimized trade-os
among stakeholders. e incorporated multimedia metrics are
computed by the state-of-the-art multimedia techniques, including
the MemNet model for the ad image memorability [17], the TakeLab
method for the semantic similarity [37], and the MBS method for
the visual saliency [43]. Moreover, our framework can be extended
with more metrics, such as ad interestingness and image aesthetic.
It should be also noted that the proposed two-stage framework
does not ensure advertisers to be truth-telling in Stage I. If an adver-
tiser is truth-telling, her utility can be obtained by computing the
dierence between her bid and payment. If she is not truth-telling,
her value can be learnt from historical ad auctions in Stage I. Value
estimation models were discussed by Athey and Nekipelov [2], and
Pin and Key [33], respectively. Similarly, we can assume each ad-
vertiser is optimal – who maximizes her expected utility in the
bidding – and then estimate her value from the training data, and
the data should be obtained from the two-stage framework rather
than the existing RTB campaigns. On the other hand, we think the
proposed framework will not signicantly aect an advertiser’s
truthfulness. Firstly, the three multimedia metric variables and the
ad CTR are exogenous. ey do not directly aect an advertiser’s
bidding behaviour. Secondly, advertisers’ payments are computed
by creating pseudo slots. If an advertiser is not the winning adver-
tiser in the ground truth but she is selected aer re-ranking, her
Table 3: Multimedia datasets.
Dataset AOL YouTube
Ad network AOL ONE Google AdSense
From 06 Sept 2016 06 Sept 2016
To 09 Sept 2016 09 Sept 2016
Location Singapore Singapore
# of unique webpages 5,243 7,173
# of unique ads 96 539
Table 4: Ad auction datasets.
Dataset SSP Microso
Ad type Display Search
Ad auction SP (RTB) GSP
Market UK US
From 08 Jan 2013 26 Dec 2011
To 14 Feb 2013 03 Mar 2012
# of ad slots 31 4,376
# of user tags NA NA
# of publishers NA 1
# of advertisers 374 NA
# of auctions 6,646,643 35,550
# of bids 33,043,127 NA
Bid quote GBP/CPM GBP/CPC
Bids of each auction
√
NA
Winning bid
√ √
Winning payment
√ √
Estimated CTR NA
√
Table 5: Summary of CTRs in the Microso dataset.
Position Minimum Maximum Mean Std.
of CTR of CTR of CTR of CTR
1 0.00‰ 333.30‰ 13.97‰ 28.49‰
2 0.00‰ 200.00‰ 7.97‰ 15.30‰
3 0.00‰ 750.00‰ 5.66‰ 12.47‰
4 0.00‰ 90.90‰ 4.53‰ 9.68‰
5 0.00‰ 76.90‰ 1.53‰ 3.58‰
6 0.00‰ 333.30‰ 1.11‰ 3.62‰
7 0.00‰ 1000.00‰ 0.68‰ 5.73‰
8 0.00‰ 108.10‰ 0.51‰ 1.65‰
actual payment in the two-stage framework is equal to the payment
from the SP auction without other advertisers who have higher bids
than her. Since advertisers’ bids are not disclosed, compared to the
existing RTB, the winning advertiser has no further information to
support her nontruth-telling biddings.
4 EXPERIMENTS
is section describes our datasets, experimental seings, variable
analysis, sensitivity analysis, and overall results.
4.1 Datasets
Four distinct datasets are used in our experiments, including two
multimedia datasets and two ad auction datasets. e two multime-
dia datasets contain the data collected from AOL and YouTube over
the period from 06 September to 09 September in 2016. AOL is an
article sharing website while YouTube is a video sharing website.
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Figure 2: Unique ads in the multimedia datasets.
e two platforms use dierent ad networks: AOL uses AOL Adver-
tising; YouTube uses Google AdSense. Both datasets were collected
in Singapore. As we focus on the single slot ad displaying, each
webpage in our datasets contains only one ad slot. We start col-
lecting the data from a particular seed URL that contains multiple
categories of content.2 In this way, the diversity of webpages and
banner ads can be ensured. In collecting the data, the web browser
is set in the privacy mode, which disables browsing history, web
cache and data storage in cookies so that the collected banner ads
are not aected by the previous page views. In each dataset, we ex-
tract the ads from their webpages to create a set of banner ads and a
set of webpages with blank ad slots. For each webpage, the collected
data includes title, keywords, description, whole webpage snapshot,
ad image. We also crawl title, keywords and description from the ad
landing page (i.e., the delivered webpage if an ad is clicked by the
visiting user). Note that we do not consider animation ads in our
banner ads. When collecting text information about the webpage
for YouTube, we also crawl video tags. All the collected text data
can be viewed as a summary about the webpage, which can be
used to measure the contextual relevance with ad candidates in
experiments. Table 3 describes our multimedia datasets. We collect
5,243 unique webpages from AOL and 7,173 unique webpages from
YouTube, and the number of their corresponding unique banner
ads are 96 and 539, respectively. Fig. 2 shows the growth trends of
unique ads on both platforms. Although there are a large number
of impressions in the ad network, only a few ads are displayed.
We nd that some ads re-appear from time to time. e repetitive
display strategy reinforces users’ memory for branding but it also
is a source of intrusiveness into users’ online experience [6].
e two ad auction datasets contain campaign information for
display advertising and sponsored search. Table 4 provides a brief
summary of both datasets. For display advertising, the dataset re-
ports 33,043,127 bids in 6,646,643 auctions over 31 ad slots from a
medium-size supply-side platform (SSP) in the UK over the period
from 08 January 2013 to 14 February 2013. is SSP dataset has also
been used in several recent online advertising studies [8, 11, 42]
and is used as the major dataset in our experiments. In the other ad
2 AOL: http://www.aol.com
YouTube: https://www.youtube.com/channels
Figure 3: Relationship among variables in the ground truth data (before normalization).
auction dataset, the estimated campaign results of 547 keywords
were crawled from Microso adCentre (now Bing Ads) over the
period from 26 Dec 2011 to 03 Mar 2012. In adCentre, the targeted
keywords, budget, and other seings like matching types were sub-
mied to the system. It then returned a list of estimated statistics,
including the estimated cost-per-click (CPC), clicks, and impres-
sions based on 8 positions, which are ranked from top to boom in
the mainline paid listing and sidebar paid listing of search engine
result pages. e Microso dataset provides information of CTRs,
which is important in our proposed model but is not included in the
SSP dataset. Table 5 summarizes CTRs across keywords in the Mi-
croso dataset. Since we focus on the single slot ad displaying, we
use the CTR estimated from the rst ad position from the mainline
paid listing to simulate the CTR in our experiments.
4.2 Experimental Settings
As described in Section 4.1, each of our datasets only provides
partial information: the SSP dataset provides advertisers’ bids for
each auction which can also be used for computing the revenue
and the utility; the Microso dataset provides CTR distributions
on dierent ad positions; the AOL and YouTube datasets contain
screenshots of ads and webpages and their textual descriptions,
which can be used to calculate the multimedia metrics such as
ad image memorability, the contextual relevance, and the visual
saliency. To simulate a real world display advertising environment,
we randomly sample and match records and metrics to connect our
auction datasets with the multimedia datasets so that each ad will
have both bidding campaign records and multimedia metrics. Given
a webpage from the multimedia datasets, we use the following ve
steps to reproduce its corresponding auction:
Step 1: Sampling an auction in RTB
We randomly sample an auction from the SSP dataset. e auc-
tion contains a set of advertisers and their bids.
Step 2: Creating the ground truth data
Since the given webpage has an ad displayed when it is web
crawled. is original ad is considered as the ground truth.
Step 3: Sampling candidate ads
Let n denote the number of advertisers in the sampled auction
in Step 1. We then randomly sample n − 1 ads from the same
Webpage image Ad images Variables for re-ranking (aer normalization)
Ad id: 3010 (ground true)
Ad id: 1799
Ad id: 5552
Ad id: 2725
Ad id: 1319
Ad id: 4194
Ad id: 1847
Ad id: 693
Ad id: 3402
Ad id x1 x2 x3 x4 x5 x6
693 0.1999 0.0000 0.7164 0.9387 0.1699 0.7286
1319 0.0400 0.0000 0.8277 0.4077 0.2187 0.1639
1799 0.0160 0.0264 0.5567 0.3353 0.3698 0.8360
1847 0.0000 0.0176 0.8971 0.3698 0.2671 0.1025
2725 0.0000 0.0000 0.9244 0.0712 0.2617 0.8763
3010 0.1999 0.1101 0.9139 0.2596 0.2734 0.1059
3402 0.1441 0.0614 0.8950 0.7269 0.2361 0.7804
4194 0.0400 0.0000 1.0000 0.0720 0.2163 0.2629
5552 0.0400 0.1148 0.5420 0.2836 0.3405 0.8823
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Figure 4: Empirical example of sensitivity analysis of re-ranking for an AOL page view: (a) the raw data in the auction where
the ground truth has been highlighted in bold; (b) the comparison of the ground truth ad with other candidates; (c) sensitive
analysis of weights in this auction.
multimedia dataset of the webpage. To ensure the uniqueness
of each ad in the auction, we exclude the original ad when we
sample n − 1 ads from the multimedia dataset.
Step 4: Matching ads and bids
We match the n bids with n ads. Since the original ad is displayed,
we consider it belongs to the winning advertiser in the auction
and match it with the highest bid. e rest n − 1 ads and n − 1
bids are then randomly matched.
Step 5: Simulating CTRs
For each ad, we generate its CTR from a uniform distribution
in the range of 0 and 13.97‰+ 1.96 × 28.49‰. is is based on
the mean and std. of CTRs in the rst position in the Microso
dataset, as also shown in Table 5.
e above ve steps allow us to have enough information to
compute the mentioned six metric variables for each ad in each
auction. We then re-rank ads based on the trade-os preference,
which is expressed in terms of weights. In experiments, we perform
the 10-fold cross validation method to obtain the optimal weights
as well as to provide the performance analysis.
4.3 Variable Analysis
e values of metric variables in the ground truth are examined –
those ads which have been recommended to users under the SP auc-
tion model in RTB. For each impression, it contains the publisher’s
revenue, the advertiser’s utility, the ad CTR, and the multimedia
variables. Fig. 3 shows the descriptive statistics. e density plots
along the diagonal show the distribution of each variable individu-
ally; the scaer plots lying in the lower triangular region show how
much one variable is aected by another; and their linear correla-
tions are given in the corresponding areas in the upper triangular
part. e scaer plots lying on the boom row shows the values of
each variable under the two platforms and the right column show
the variations and outliers of each variable. Note that relevance
score ranges from 0 to 5, where 5 indicates most relevant and 0 indi-
cates irrelevant, and the scores of memorability and saliency range
from 0 to 1, respectively. Several ndings are worth mentioning.
Firstly, many displayed ads in the ground truth data are irrelevant
to the contents of their hosting webpages, which will result in less
user engagement. Secondly, most of displayed ads are not salient,
thus can be easily overlooked. ese two ndings may explain the
phenomenon of ad overlook in the existing advertising systems [37].
We also nd that pairwise variables are independent, which allows
using linear combination to calculate the rank score for each ad in
the auction without considering the correlation matrix.
4.4 Sensitivity Analysis
Fig. 4 presents an empirical example of analysing trade-os among
stakeholders by investigating all advertisers’ ads and possible weights
of metric variables. Fig. 4(a) shows the screenshot of the webpage,
where ad 3010 (i.e., the ground truth) is displayed on the side bar.
Since the sampled RTB auction has 9 advertisers, we further sam-
ple 8 candidate ads from the AOL dataset. ey have almost the
same width and length as the ground truth ad. However, they have
dierent contents, color themes, and descriptions. Fig. 4(a) table
exhibits the computed values of variables for re-ranking, where the
ground truth has been highlighted in bold. It has the highest value
in revenue; and relatively high values in utility, memorability; but
small values in CTR, relevance and saliency. Obviously, the ground
truth is biased towards the publisher’s interest.
Radar charts shown in Fig. 4(b) provide a clearer comparison of
the ground truth ad with other ad candidates. Each radar chart has
multiple axes and each variable is shown as a point on the axis. A
point closer to the center on an axis indicates a lower value and vice
versa. In radar charts, all values of variables are further normalized
into the range between 0 and 1. If all the variables’ values of an ad
are less than another ad, we call it being strictly dominated because
this ad will have no possibility to be selected in the second stage
re-ranking. For example, ad 1319 is strictly dominated and its area
in the radar chart can be fully covered by ad 3402.
Fig. 4(c) shows all possible combinations of the weights in the
re-ranking. For each subplot, x-axis represents all the weights in-
stances that make the ad win the auction, and y-axis represents the
values of weights in each instance based on stack bars. Note that the
subplots of ad 1319 and ad 1847 are empty, indicating that no maer
what weights we choose, these two ads will never be selected in
the auction. An ad can be selected if its high valued variables have
large weights. Of course, the weights represent the preference of
trade-os and dierent numbers of weights combination instances
of ads also tell that they do not have equal chances to be selected
in the re-ranking. Although ad 1847 is not strictly dominated in
radar charts, it is not been selected in all weights combinations.
is is because most of its variables’ values are relatively small and
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Figure 5: e eect of θ1 on the sum of total rank scores of
the selected advertisers in auctions.
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Figure 6: e eect of θ1 on the changes of variables.
its highest variable value is still less than that of ad 3010. ere-
fore, even when the trade-os preference is biased towards the ad
memorability, the rank score of ad 1847 is still less than ad 3010.
We simply call it to be weakly dominated.
4.5 Overall Results
We validate the proposed framework by conducting the 10-fold
cross validation on both AOL and YouTube datasets. e optimal
weights are estimated from the training set; they are then used
for re-ranking ads in the auctions in the test set. For simplicity
but without lose of generality, the threshold value θk is set to be
zero for any k ∈ K \ {1} so that the eects of θ1 can be examined
explicitly. As described earlier, θ1 is the maximum decrease of
the publisher’s revenue, which indicates how much the publisher
would like to sacrice in order to increase the benets of the other
two stakeholders. erefore, θ1 lies in the interval between -1 and 0.
Table 6: Summary of optimal trade-os among stakeholders in the AOL dataset where θ1 = −0.06. Note that ωi , i = 1, . . . , 6
represent the optimal weights obtained from training set, and ξi , i = 1, . . . , 6 represent the changes of corresponding variables.
Fold Optimal weight Training set Test set
ω1 ω2 ω3 ω4 ω5 ω6 ξ1 ξ2 ξ3 ξ4 ξ5 ξ6 ξ1 ξ2 ξ3 ξ4 ξ5 ξ6
1 0.45 0.30 0.05 0.05 0.15 0.00 -5.5% 2.3% 3.4% 26.7% 17.4% 4.4% -5.8% 1.0% 4.0% 30.1% 23.7% 1.3%
2 0.45 0.30 0.05 0.05 0.15 0.00 -5.5% 2.5% 3.5% 26.7% 17.6% 4.1% -5.7% -0.7% 3.9% 30.6% 22.0% 3.7%
3 0.45 0.30 0.05 0.05 0.15 0.00 -5.5% 1.8% 3.6% 27.3% 18.2% 3.7% -5.7% 6.3% 3.0% 25.3% 16.7% 7.6%
4 0.45 0.30 0.05 0.05 0.15 0.00 -5.5% 1.9% 3.5% 27.5% 17.8% 4.1% -5.1% 4.8% 3.3% 23.4% 19.7% 4.3%
5 0.45 0.30 0.05 0.05 0.15 0.00 -5.5% 2.5% 3.4% 27.3% 18.0% 4.1% -5.5% 0.1% 4.1% 25.4% 18.5% 3.8%
6 0.45 0.30 0.05 0.05 0.15 0.00 -5.6% 2.4% 3.6% 27.2% 18.2% 4.1% -5.0% 0.9% 2.9% 26.3% 16.2% 4.2%
7 0.45 0.30 0.05 0.05 0.15 0.00 -5.5% 2.2% 3.5% 26.8% 18.2% 4.3% -5.9% 2.5% 3.4% 29.3% 16.7% 2.4%
8 0.45 0.30 0.05 0.05 0.15 0.00 -5.6% 2.1% 3.6% 27.4% 18.4% 4.4% -4.9% 3.4% 2.6% 24.2% 14.6% 1.5%
9 0.45 0.30 0.05 0.05 0.15 0.00 -5.5% 2.2% 3.5% 27.2% 18.3% 4.0% -5.3% 2.7% 3.8% 25.7% 15.6% 4.7%
10 0.45 0.30 0.05 0.05 0.15 0.00 -5.4% 2.3% 3.5% 26.6% 18.1% 3.7% -6.1% 1.3% 4.0% 30.8% 17.0% 8.0%
Mean - - - - - - -5.5% 2.2% 3.5% 27.1% 18.0% 4.1% -5.5% 2.2% 3.5% 27.1% 18.1% 4.1%
Std. - - - - - - 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.020 0.004 0.026 0.027 0.021
Table 7: Summary of optimal trade-os among stakeholders in the YouTube dataset where θ1 = −0.07. Note that ωi , i = 1, . . . , 6
represent the optimal weights obtained from training set, and ξi , i = 1, . . . , 6 represent the changes of corresponding variables.
Fold Optimal weight Training set Test set
ω1 ω2 ω3 ω4 ω5 ω6 ξ1 ξ2 ξ3 ξ4 ξ5 ξ6 ξ1 ξ2 ξ3 ξ4 ξ5 ξ6
1 0.45 0.25 0.10 0.00 0.15 0.05 -6.2% 0.3% 4.9% 0.0% 23.5% 17.9% -6.2% 0.5% 4.7% -2.7% 30.5% 18.2%
2 0.45 0.30 0.05 0.05 0.10 0.05 -6.9% 5.7% 2.2% 27.2% 14.7% 20.9% -6.8% 7.2% 1.3% 27.4% 18.9% 21.8%
3 0.45 0.30 0.05 0.05 0.10 0.05 -6.9% 5.8% 2.1% 27.4% 14.6% 21.0% -6.8% 6.8% 2.6% 25.7% 19.2% 21.1%
4 0.45 0.30 0.05 0.05 0.10 0.05 -6.8% 5.4% 2.1% 27.0% 15.4% 21.1% -7.2% 9.5% 2.4% 29.1% 12.5% 20.1%
5 0.45 0.30 0.05 0.05 0.10 0.05 -6.8% 5.9% 2.1% 27.4% 15.4% 20.9% -7.2% 5.9% 2.3% 24.9% 12.1% 22.5%
6 0.45 0.30 0.05 0.05 0.10 0.05 -6.9% 6.2% 2.2% 27.3% 15.4% 20.5% -6.8% 3.4% 2.0% 25.7% 12.4% 25.8%
7 0.45 0.30 0.05 0.05 0.10 0.05 -6.8% 6.0% 2.1% 26.8% 15.1% 20.8% -7.2% 4.2% 2.4% 30.7% 15.1% 23.1%
8 0.45 0.30 0.05 0.05 0.10 0.05 -6.8% 5.9% 2.1% 27.2% 15.2% 21.1% -7.2% 5.4% 2.9% 26.6% 14.4% 20.8%
9 0.45 0.30 0.05 0.05 0.10 0.05 -6.9% 5.8% 2.2% 27.1% 14.9% 21.1% -6.9% 6.3% 1.8% 27.8% 16.5% 20.3%
10 0.45 0.30 0.05 0.05 0.10 0.05 -6.9% 5.8% 2.2% 26.9% 15.3% 21.4% -6.9% 6.5% 1.8% 30.3% 12.9% 17.7%
Mean - - - - - - -6.8% 5.3% 2.4% 24.4% 16.0% 20.7% -6.9% 5.6% 2.4% 24.5% 16.5% 21.1%
Std. - - - - - - 0.001 0.016 0.008 0.081 0.025 0.009 0.002 0.023 0.008 0.092 0.053 0.022
e smaller the value of θ1, the more is the increase in the benets
of other stakeholders.
Fig. 5 presents the eect of θ1 on the sum of rank scores of the
selected advertisers in auctions. When θ1 decreases, the sum of
rank scores increases. is monotone decreasing paern is because
that the solution space of weights increases if θ1 decreases (see
Section 3.2.2). Also, in the 10-fold cross validation, the size of the
training set is 9 times of the test set, the solution space of weights
and the sum of rank scores in the training set are roughly 9 times
of the test set. e eects of θ1 on the changes of metric variables
are examined in Fig. 6. In both AOL and YouTube datasets, the
changes of variables in the training data follow the same paerns
as those in the test data. If θ1 is close to 0, the SP auction (the
ground truth) is the optimal solution. is means that our model
suggests that the publisher shouldn’t sacrice any revenue. If the
publisher further decreases θ1, the optimal weights change. ere
will be some growth in the variables of other stakeholders, and of
course, the publisher’s revenue starts to decrease. If θ1 is small, the
publisher’s revenue will decrease signicantly and she may nd it
unacceptable. As shown in Fig. 6, if θ1 is less than -0.3, it reduces the
publisher’s revenue by almost 30%. ere is no monotone increasing
paern in other variables. Analyzing the changes in variables will
help the publisher to decide a proper θ1. Tables 6-7 further present
two special cases: θ1 = −0.06 for the AOL dataset; and θ1 = −0.07
for the YouTube dataset. Both cases show the results when the
decrease in the publisher’s revenue is close to the pre-specied
threshold value θ1. For example, there is about 5.5% decrease in
the publisher’s revenue in the AOL training set and other variables
enjoy certain increases ranging from 2.2% to 27.1%.
5 CONCLUSION
is paper discusses a two-stage framework that optimizes trade-
os among stakeholders in display advertising. Dierent to many
related studies which only focus on the publisher’s revenue, we
further consider the benets of the advertiser and the user by incor-
porating multimedia metrics. e trade-os optimization is based
on a linear combination of all metric variables and their weights are
learnt from data. Variable and sensitivity analysis are conducted
to explore the solution space. Our experimental results validate
the proposed framework and show that it is able to increase the
benets of other two stakeholders with just a slight decrease in
the publisher’s revenue. In the long run, beer engagement of
advertisers and users will increase the demand of advertising and
supply of webpage visits, which can then boost the publisher’s rev-
enue. Future research can potentially discuss a framework which
considers a generalized scenario where a webpage has multiple ad
slots being separately auctioned o in RTB. e long-term eects
of trade-os optimization can also be further investigated and it
would be very interesting if the framework can be tested over a
live seing.
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